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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ROGER L. STRADER,

:

De f endant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 940244-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered
upon a plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly find that the charges

against defendant--possession of a controlled substance, theft,
and giving false information to a police officer--did not arise
from the same criminal episode?

This issue challenges the trial

court's interpretation of a statute, which presents a question of
law reviewed by this Court using a correction-of-error standard.
State v. Stettina, 868 P.2d 108, 109 (Utah App. 1994); State v.
Phathammavonq. 860 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Utah App. 1993); State v.
Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993).

2.

Did entry of defendant's guilty plea to the false

information charge bar subsequent prosecution of the theft and
possession charges against defendant?

This issue also raises a

question of statutory interpretation and is reviewed under the
same standard applicable to issue #1.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 22, 1992, the West Valley City prosecutor
charged defendant Roger L. Strader with giving false information
to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1990) (R. 128, Exh. D-2). Defendant
entered a plea of guilty in the Third Circuit Court on September
3, 1992, and was sentenced to ten days in jail and a $50.00 fine,
with the jail term suspended upon timely payment of the fine (R.
128, Exh. D-2)•
On October 19, 1992, defendant was charged in the Third
Judicial District Court with possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991); theft, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990); and giving false
information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in

2

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1990) (R. 3, 11-13).x
On November 22, 1993, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
information, claiming that the prosecution was barred under
sections 76-1-401 to -403, Utah Code Annotated, rule 9.5, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Utah Constitution (R. 3132).

Following an evidentiary hearing on the same day, the trial

court granted defendant's motion as to the false information
charge, and denied the motion in all other respects (R. 34;
Hearing Transcript [hereinafter »Tr,f] 121) .2 Defendant later
pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance pursuant to
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), preserving his
right to appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to dismiss
(R. 41-47, 59). The theft count was dismissed, and the court
sentenced defendant to pay a fine and serve a period of not more
than five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 41-47, 60) . The
court then suspended the sentence and placed defendant on parole
for 36 months (id.).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Near 11:00 p.m. on July 21, 1992, Officer Jerry Randle
was completing some paperwork in his patrol car parked in an

1

On February 23, 1993, the State amended the information to
reflect attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A
misdemeanor, and to dismiss the false information charge (R. 4,
11) . Defendant pled guilty to the amended information (R. 4) .
However, he was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea on May 25,
1993 (R. 5)•
2

The record reflects that the false information charge was
dismissed before defendant was bound over to the district court (R.
6) .

3

apartment parking lot in West Valley City (Tr. 87-88, 91). He
looked up to see a car pull into the construction site south of
him and the driver get out and enter a building on the site (Tr.
87, 91). The driver exited the building shortly thereafter with
something in his hands, put the object in the car, and pulled
away (Tr, 87, 91). Officer Randle turned on his lights and made
a traffic stop (Tr. 92). He found defendant Roger L. Strader in
the driver's seat and a female in the passenger seat (Tr. 92-94).
The officer first asked defendant for identification, but
defendant did not have any; instead he gave the name Stanley Kent
Strader and the birth date of March 1, 1953 (Tr. 92-93) . The
officer then asked about the circular saw he could see in the
back seat of the car (Tr. 93). Defendant claimed to have picked
it up for his friend, Tony Ochoa (Tr. 93).
The passenger offered to get defendant's
identification, explaining that they lived in an apartment across
the street from the construction site (Tr. 93). She left but did
not return (Tr. 94). Instead, a man identifying himself as Tony
Ochoa brought Officer Randle a wallet and pulled out a driver's
license belonging to Earl S. Nesbitt (Tr. 94). The officer
observed that the "skin" of the license had been pulled up and a
picture of defendant placed underneath it (Tr. 94). At that
point the officer arrested defendant for giving him false
information, handcuffed him and placed him in his patrol car (Tr.
95).

The officer then requested a check of the license plate on

defendant's car and discovered that it belonged to another
4

vehicle (Tr. 95). Because of defendant's arrest and the false
registration, Officer Randle decided to impound the car (Tr. 9596).

During an inventory search conducted at the construction

site, the officer found a syringe containing clear fluid under
the driver's seat and a packet of syringes inside the glove
compartment (Tr. 96). He then radioed for a dog and had a canine
search conducted (Tr. 96). The search revealed a syringe under
the seatcover on the driver's seat containing residue (Tr. 97,
100).

Both syringes were later determined to contain

methamphetamine (R. 47; Tr. 100).
Meanwhile, another officer located the owner of the
saw, who arrived at the construction site while defendant was
still there and confirmed that the saw had been stolen (Tr. 97).
Defendant was taken to the West Valley City police department
and, after receiving his Miranda warnings, admitted that the
syringe found under the seatcover was his and that Stanley was
his brother's name; he denied everything else (Tr. 98-99).

The

West Valley City prosecutor filed charges shortly thereafter.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The three offenses with which defendant was charged did
not encompass a single criminal objective and, hence, did not
arise from a single criminal episode as defined by Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-401 (1990).

Defendant speculates on appeal about possible

objectives behind the false information offense.

However, the

only objective mentioned below was defendant's alleged wish to
avoid being arrested for the other offenses, and that objective

5

has no record support.

Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has

determined that where a defendant commits a crime in order to
avoid arrest for unrelated, prior criminal conduct, he is
generally not entitled to have the offenses treated as arising
from a single criminal episode.

State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577,

578 (Utah 1977).
Defendant's assertion that the State conceded that the
offenses arose from a single criminal episode by charging all
three offenses in a single information in the district court was
not raised below and is not properly before this Court.

Further,

the mere charging of multiple offenses in one document does not
necessitate the conclusion that they arose from a single criminal
episode.
Finally, because the trial court properly concluded
that the offenses did not arise from a single criminal episode,
the district court prosecution was not barred by Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-403 (1990), or rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS
PROPER BECAUSE THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM DID
NOT ARISE FROM A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE
A.

Introduction
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it

denied his motion to dismiss the theft and possession charges
filed in the Third District Court after his false information
conviction in circuit court.

Br. of App. at 10-18.
6

He claims

that all three of the charges arose from a single criminal
episode, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1990), and
that, pursuant to rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402 and -403 (1990), entry of his guilty
plea to the false information charge effectively bars the
subsequent theft and possession prosecutions.3

Id.

The trial court held that the charges did not arise
from a single criminal episode, but were comprised of different
offenses arising under different statutes, were prosecutable in
different jurisdictions, and were punishable by different
penalties (Tr. 121-25).

Addendum A.

Of primary importance to

the court, however, was the fact that the offenses did not share
the same criminal objective (Tr. 121-22).

Addendum A.

The court

noted that the objective of the theft was to permanently deprive
the owner of his property, and that any objective to possessing
drugs had no relationship to the offense of giving false
information to a police officer (Tr. 122) . Addendum A.

The

court went on to note that the false information went only to
defendant's identity and that the reasons for giving the false
information were not before him:
. . . [Defendant's] purpose and objective of giving
false information to a police officer was not to reveal
his name. For whatever reason, that is not before me
at this time.
There has been some speculation that the reason
why he said that is to prevent [himself] from being
discovered on all the other criminal conduct, i.e.
3

Defendant does not present a constitutional double jeopardy
argument.

7

possession of the controlled substance as well as [the]
theft case, but then that is just speculative before
me. There is no indication to indicate that before me
at all. So, the difference in criminal objective in my
mind is one of the main difference[s] . . . .
(Tr. 122-23).

Addendum A.

B. The Offenses Did Not Encompass A Single Criminal Objective
And, Hence, Did Not Arise From A Single Criminal Episode
This appeal turns on the issue of whether the three
offenses arose from a single criminal episode.

Section 76-1-401

defines "single criminal episode" as encompassing "all conduct
which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or
an accomplishment of a single criminal objective."

Addendum B.

The issue below and on appeal deals with the "single
criminal objective" requirement.

Defendant provides a myriad of

reasons on appeal for having given Officer Handle a false name:
deflecting attention from himself, covering up the theft,
avoiding detection of the controlled substances he possessed,
preventing discovery of his prior criminal history, minimizing
the suspicion his own name may have aroused in the officer, and
minimizing the duration of the encounter with the officer. Br.
of App. at 12. He then claims that the real objective was to
avoid being caught for the theft and possession offenses.
13.

Id. at

While any one or combination of these reasons may have been

the motivation behind defendant's use of his brother's name, only
the last objective was presented to the trial court (R. 122-23;
Tr. 104, 117). The remaining reasons are presented for the first
time on appeal and are not supported by the record.
they are not properly before this Court.
8

Accordingly,

See, e.g., State v.

Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986) (references to matters
outside the record will not be considered); State v. Hutchinas,
672 P.2d 404, 405 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (appellate court will
not review allegations of facts outside the record on appeal);
State v. Truiillo, 656 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1982) (per curiam)
(appellate courts "are generally precluded from addressing
matters outside the record").
Further, as the trial court noted, there was no
evidence offered below to support the objective of avoiding
arrest for the possession and theft offenses; defense counsel
merely raised the objective in his argument to the court (R. 12223; Tr. 104, 117). The facts suggest that the false information
offense was a spontaneous one committed without a clear
objective.

The evidence established that defendant stole a

circular saw, put it on the back seat of his car and drove from
the site of the theft only to be immediately stopped by a police
officer.

He had no identification or driver's license with him.

Despite counsel's speculation, it is not apparent from the record
how giving a false name under these circumstances would reduce
the possibility that defendant's crimes would be discovered.
Regardless of the name he used, he was still likely to be
detained long enough to receive a citation for driving without a
license, and the saw remained in plain view of the officer,
leaving no clear benefit from using a false name. While one
could speculate as to the reasons a false name would be
preferable to defendant's own name under these circumstances-9

e.g., there was an outstanding warrant under his own name for
which he might immediately be arrested, or he preferred that any
ticket he received be the responsibility of his brother--the fact
remains that there is no evidence to support defendant's alleged
criminal objective.

On these facts, the trial court reached the

logical conclusion that the objective behind giving a false name
was to avoid giving his true name (Tr. 122-23).

That objective

has no relationship to either of the remaining offenses at issue.
As defendant offered no evidence to support his speculation that
his objective was to avoid capture for his previous crimes, his
claim of a single criminal objective is without merit, and the
appeal should be dismissed.
Even assuming that the false information was given, at
least in part, to avoid capture for both the theft and possession
offenses, the crimes still do not arise from a single criminal
episode under section 76-1-401. To hold otherwise would permit
defendant to escape the demands of justice by simply linking
unrelated criminal offenses with an additional offense in an
attempt to avoid detection of the crimes.

This result has been

rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.
In State v. Cornish. 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), the
defendant stole an automobile and, while driving it, was involved
in a high-speed chase with a police officer the following day.
Id. at 577. Addendum C.

He was charged with theft and failure

to stop at the command of a police officer.

Id.

On separate

complaints, he was convicted first of "unlawful taking of a
10

vehicle," then of failing to stop.

Id.

On appeal, he argued

that the two offenses arose from a single criminal episode and
that, therefore, prosecution for failing to stop was barred by
his earlier conviction.

Id.

The supreme court found that the

objective of the unlawful taking "was to obtain possession, be it
permanent or temporary, of another's automobile."

Id. at 578.

It found the objective of failing to stop "was to avoid arrest
for the traffic violations he had just committed and/or to avoid
being found in a stolen motor vehicle."

Id. Accordingly, the

court held that the objectives as well as the proof requirements
of the two offenses were different and that they did not warrant
treatment as a single criminal episode.

Id.

The Court reasoned

that to hold otherwise "would mean that any crime a defendant
commits to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity would be part
of the same criminal episode.

This does not appear to be the

intent of the statute . . . ." Id.
Likewise, the mere fact that defendant in this case
committed a crime (giving false information) to avoid arrest for
two unrelated, prior criminal offenses does not entitle him to
treat all the offenses as arising from a single criminal episode
under section 76-1-401.

Cornish, 571 P.2d at 578. Addendum C.

The objective of theft is to obtain possession of another's
property, and the offense was completed at the time defendant
removed the saw from the construction site.

See id.

The

objective of possessing a controlled substance, while not
elaborated on below, has no connection to the theft, except for
11

the coincidental presence of the controlled substance in the car.
These offenses are distinct from each other and from the false
information offense, the proof requirements of the three offenses
differ, and the possibility that the false information may have
been given, in part, to avoid being caught for the prior two
offenses does not create a common criminal objective sufficient
to meet the "single criminal episode" definition of section 76-1401.

See id.

Consequently, defendant's claim is without merit,

and his conviction should be affirmed.
C. Defendant's Waiver Argument Is Not Properly Before This
Court; Further, The State Did Not Concede That The Offenses Arose
From A Single Criminal Episode By Charging All Three Offenses In
A Single Information
Defendant argues that the fact that the county attorney
included all three charges in a single information in the
district court amounts to a concession by the State that the
offenses arise from a single criminal episode.
15-16.

Br. of App. at

This Court should not reach this argument because it is

raised for the first time on appeal.

State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d

149, 155 n.3 (Utah App. 1994) (appellate court will not consider
on appeal an objection not raised below); State ex rel. E.D. v.
E.J.D., 876 P.2d 397, 402 (Utah App. 1994) (appellate court
refuses to address an issue raised for the first time on appeal);
State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994).
Even on the merits, the claim must fail as the State
did not concede the issue below.

While rule 9.5, Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure, requires that all offenses arising from a
single criminal episode be charged in a single information
12

(Addendum B), the converse of that statement is not necessarily
true:

multiple offenses charged in a single information do not

necessarily arise from a single criminal episode.

Prosecutors

have broad latitude to charge multiple offenses in a single
information, and the basis for the joinder may be other than a
common criminal episode.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(a) (Supp.

1994) (permitting such a filing if the offenses are "based on the
same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their
commission" QT are "alleged to have been part of a common scheme
or plan") (emphasis added); cf. State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah
App.) (approving of the charging in one document of two separate
robberies with parallel fact patterns), cert, denied, 843 P.2d
1042 (Utah 1992).

Moreover, the State's active defense against

defendant's claim of a single criminal episode belies any claim
that the State believed otherwise when it filed the information.
D. Because The Offenses Did Not Arise From A Single Criminal
Objective, Defendant's Claim That The District Court Filing Was
Barred Bv The Rules Of Criminal Procedure And State Statute
Necessarily Fails
Finally, defendant asserts that rule 9.5 and sections
76-1-401(2) and 76-1-403(1) bar the prosecution of the theft and
possession charges in district court because he pled guilty to
the false information charge in the circuit court.
at 17-18.

Br. of App.

He argues that rule 9.5 and section 76-1-401(2)

mandate that all three charges be brought in the district court
as that court had jurisdiction over the offense with the highest
possible penalty of the three charges. He then asserts the
procedural bar in section 76-1-403, which prohibits prosecution
13

of an offense after a conviction has been entered for another
offense which arose from the same criminal episode.

By their

express terms, rule 9.5 and sections 76-1-402(2) and -403(1)
require a threshold determination that the three charges arose
from a single criminal episode.

See Addendum B.

above, this threshold condition has not been met.

As established
Hence, this

Court need not reach defendant's final asseirtion of error.4
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and
sentence.
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
The State does not believe that oral argument would be
beneficial in this case or that a published opinion is warranted.
Defendant's request to the contrary rests solely on his final
argument, which need not be reached unless defendant prevails on
his initial claim that the charges in this case arose from a
single criminal episode. As Utah Supreme Court case law is
4

Defendant argues that so long as the district court has
jurisdiction over one of several offenses arising from a single
criminal episode, all the charges must be brought in the district
court.
Br. of App. at 17-18.
However, the bright-line rule
defendant advocates has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.
In State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme
Court noted that it had previously ff [taken] care to avoid a rigid
rule mandating joinder whenever a defendant commits a crime to
avoid arrest for prior criminal activity, [State v. Cornish, 571
P.2d 577,] 578". IcL at 61. The Court explained that its "failure
to announce that such conduct always warrants joinder does not
preclude us from concluding that under some circumstances, joinder
may be proper.11 Id. Hence, where a defendant commits a crime to
avoid arrest for prior criminal activity, a per se joinder rule is
not appropriate.
14

contrary to defendant's position, there is no reason to schedule
oral argument or to render a published opinion.

However, should

this Court reach defendant's final point, a published opinion
would be helpful to trial courts and trial counsel, but oral
argument would not be beneficial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //5_7'day of February,
1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed by first class mail,
postage prepaid, to Robert K. Heineman and David P. S. Mack,
attorneys for appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
/ S ^ a a y of February, 1995.

15

84111, this

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

T r i a l Court's Ruling,
Hearing Transcript pp. 119-24

(j--<^> — cr O
l
2

O

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *

3
4
5
6

STATE OF UTAH,

7
8
%

10
11

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 931901413

vs.
ROGER L. STRADER,
Defendant.
* * * * *

12
13

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI

14
15

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

16
17

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

18
19

NOVEMBER 22, 1993

20
21
^PISTHICTCODHT
22

fiird Judicial O^tf-jct

m -', 1994

23
24
25

FILED
OCT 0 51994
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION ^

^

APPEALS
r\ n A * I / »

1

here. These charges haven't been severed.

They have just

2

been selectively chosen and I think the fault lies with

3

West Valley City prosecutor's office for picking the one

4

they could go on quickly and knowing about the existence of

5

other ones. And I believe that under the provision we have

6

stated to the court that Mr. Strayer is entitled dismissal

7

on those remaining counts.

8

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Mack.

9

Mr. Hamp, can you give the court any guidance as

10

to when the increased jurisdiction of the circuit court

11

included charges as misdemeanors?

12

MR. HAMP:

I can't give you any dates as to when

13

that began.

I think the Nest Valley City prosecutor was

14

not including that until this years to allow them to

15

prosecute cases as misdemeanors.

16

constitutionally challenged to the point we are not

17

allowing them to do that.

Indeed that has been

18

THE COURT: Thank you.

19

Both sides submit it?

20

MR. HAMP:

I'd submit it at this time, your

22

MR. MACK:

Yes, your Honor.

23

THE COURT:

21

I appreciate that.

Honor.

It is to be noted that even though

24

there was extensive argument, both legal and factually in

25

the matter previously indicated, no memorandum was supplied
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1

by either side in this matter•

2

76-1-402, 76-1-403 as well as Rule 9.5, it is the opinion

3

of the court that Rule 9.5 says distinctly what the state

4

attempted to do in this matter.

5

someone with a crime you charge them with the higher crime,

6

and the court with its jurisdiction to do that they have

7

alleged in their information, three counts possession of a

8

controlled substance, a felony; a false information to a

9

piece officer, Class C Misdemeanor; and the theft, a Class

10
11

The examination of

If you are going to charge

A Misdemeanor.
However, the problem herein lies with the fact

12

that pursuant to the jurisdiction of West Valley City

13

prosecutor's and the Third Circuit Court as to misdemeanors

14

another matter was filed in there, that being the Class C

15

Misdemeanor, false information to a police officer.

16

office of the prosecutor of the West Valley City does not

17

have jurisdiction to prosecute felonies as Mr. Hamp has

18

indicated, which the court recognizes now and agrees with.

19

There has been an attempt to increase the jurisdiction of

20

the city prosecutor to include a Class A Misdemeanor but

21

that has come under constitutional attack.

22

The question in my mind is unsettled.

The

Regardless

23

of which, it is my opinion that at the time, that being

24

September 3rd of 1992, wherein the defendant entered a

25

guilty plea to the Class C Misdemeanor, jurisdiction was
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1

not increased to include Class A jurisdiction for West

2

Valley City prosecutors; therefore, the only crime which

3

the West Valley City prosecutor and the court, the Third

4

Circuit Court at that time, had jurisdiction over was only

5

that of Class B Misdemeanor of the—of the Class C

6

Misdemeanor false information to a police officer.

7

Mow, the issue is: Does it then have a bar to

8

subsequent prosecution?

9

single criminal episode in this matter, then that would bar

10

the subsequent offense via the information that is filed in

11

this matter.

12

criminal episode in this case. There was not a common

13

objective of all the different offenses involved here.

14

If I find there was in fact a

It is my finding that there was not a single

The offenses could have been prosecuted under

15

different statutes, under different jurisdictions, which is

16

very, very fact specific and very important in this

17

decision, as well as the fact there were different

18

penalties that may have been as a result of which and is

19

indicated only the one, the Class C Misdemeanor with the

20

city prosecutor of West Valley having jurisdiction to

21

proceed upon.

22

With there being difference in both the criminal

23

objective as well as the objections in this matter, I find

24

there is no single criminal episode which would

25

subsequently bar the filing of the information indicating
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1

the theft and possession of controlled substance, felony

2

and Class A Misdemeanor.

3

However, as to the false information to a peace

4

officer, I find that that is barred by a prior jeopardy

5

which has been contained in 76-1*403, as to subsequent

6

prosecution for the same crime which is a bit different

7

than the single criminal episode but as to the basis of

8

double jeopardy or twice in jeopardy, the court finds that

9

is identical.

Count II will therefore be dismissed,

10

subsequent prosecution, though, on Counts I and III

11

remaining counts will be allowed.

12

MR. MACK:

Your Honor, I have a question if I

13

could, just for clarification.

14

THE COURT: Yes.

15

MR. MACK:

If you're finding that was not a

16

single criminal episode—the word slips me that you

17

used—it was basically because—well, would you mind if you

18

restate what your basis for—

19

THE COURT:

I believe the difference was the

20

difference in criminal objective.

You have a theft which

21

is objective as to taking, permanently deprive.

22

the case, whatever, an objection of taking drugs has no

23

indication or no nexus to the fact that he gave false

24

information to a police officer.

25

purpose and the objective of giving false information to a

If that be

His identity for the
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1

police officer was not to reveal his name.

2

reason, that is not before me at this time.

3

For whatever

There has been some speculation that the reason

4

why he said that is to prevent from being discovered on all

5

the other criminal conduct, i.e. possession of the

6

controlled substance as well as theft case, but then that

7

is just speculative before me.

8

indicate that before me at all.

9

criminal objective in my mind is one of the main difference

There is no indication to
So, the difference in

10

and I will read that directly out of 76-1*401: single

11

criminal episode means all conduct which is closely related

12

in time—which it may or may not have been.

13

when the theft allegedly took place in relation to the

14

stop.

15

closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or

16

accomplishment of a single criminal objective.

17

there is no single criminal objective in the matter,

18

therefore, there is no single criminal episode.

19

I don't know

I do know the stop and the possession charge was

MR. MACK:

I find

Tour Honor, would you also consider

20

the statement of the officer—I believe he made—that he

21

was—how he became aware of this entire situation: As he

22

was sitting in the cars filing out paperwork, he saw this

23

activity nearby and I would submit to the court that that

24

would indicate a close proximity so he could see what was

25

happening.

The person came over and that's when the stop
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1

was made.

2
3

THE COURT:
Mr. Mack.

I have no problem with that at all#

My problem is the single criminal objective.

4

MR. MACK:

5

THE COURT: And I find that is fact demonstrative

6

and fact-sensitive.

7

MR. MACK:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

That's what I am ruling on now.
Okay.
So, Mr. Hamp, be so kind to prepare

an order in this matter.

I don't think we set a trial

date.

11

MR. MACK:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. MACK:

14

I understand that.

We had set a motion.
Is it a disposition?
Well, I think a disposition probably.

But let's see, might I have just a moment to confer?

15

THE COURT: Sure.

16

MR. MACK:

17
18

Well, your Honor, I think probably at

this point it would be best to put it on for disposition.
THE COURT: How long will it take you to get—how

19

about the 6th of December at 9:00?

20

that enough time?

21

MR. HEMP:

That's two weeks. Is

Tour Honor, I think by then we could

22

either have an answer as to whether or not we can actually

23

dispose of the case or have an answer as to trial.

24
25

THE COURT: And I would suggest under the
circumstance that some effort be made to dispose of the

49
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

00124

ADDENDUM B
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 to 403 (1990)
Rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

GENERAL PROVISIONS

76-1-401

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah
•1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 227.

C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 203.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 152.

76*1-305. Lesser included offense for which period of limitations has run.
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which the period of
limitations has not run and the defendant should be found guilty of a lesser
offense for which the period of limitations has run, the finding of the lesser
and included offense against which the statute of limitations has fun shall not
be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense.
History: C 1953, 76-1-305, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, t 76-1-305.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 225.

OJ.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 198.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=> 145V2.

PART 4
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE
•JEOPARDY
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of
offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single criminal episode'' means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of
Section 77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings.
History: C 1953, 76-1-401, enacted by L.
1973, eh. 196, I 76-1-401; 1975, ch. 47, I 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Section 77-21-31,

cited in this section, was repealed in 1980. For
the present comparable provision, see Rule 9,
R. Crim. P.

11

76-1-402

761402

CRIMINAL CODE

GENERAL PROVISIONS

NOTES TO DECISIONS

(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of" the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.

ANALY8I8

Conduct constituting single crime.
Conduct constituting separate crimes.
—Property pawned separately.
Traffic offenses.
Cited.
Conduct constituting single crime.
Retention of stolen property of different individuals is a single act and a single offense if
evidence shows that the items were retained
simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items
were the subject of a previous prosecution for
related offenses, a second prosecution was precluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah
1983).
Conduct constituting separate crimes.
Where defendant committed a robbery in one
county, and later, in another county some 65
miles away, picked up two hitchhikers and decided to kidnap them as hostages, the difference in time, location, and the criminal objectives of robbery and kidnapping rendered the
conduct separate crimes rather than one single
criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d
1206 (Utah 1977).
The unlawful taking of a vehicle and the
failure to stop at the command of a police officer were two separate offenses, and not a single
episode, because the two offenses occurred a
day apart and the criminal objective in the unlawful taking was to obtain possession while

the criminal objective in the failure to stop was
to avoid arrest for a traffic violation. State v.
Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977).
Defendant's actions did not constitute a "single criminal episode" since he committed two
separate burglaries by breaking into two separate buildings within an apartment complex,
even though the burglaries were only 20
minutes apart. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174
(Utah 1985).
—Property pawned separately.
Where property was stolen and defendant received and pawned it on three separate days
spread over a period of 18 days, the offenses did
not arise out of a single criminal episode. State
v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986).
Traffic offenses.
This section does not prevent the prosecution
of a drunk driving charge under § 41-6-44 after the defendant has pleaded guilty to driving
without a license, without a registration certificate and without a safety sticker, since the
citations charge separate offenses entirely unrelated to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606
P 2d 253 (Utah 1980).
Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896
(Utah 1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749
P.2d 631 (Utah 1988); State v. Fletcher, 751
P.2d 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ortega,
751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1988); State v. Johnson,
115 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 20.

C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 14.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 29.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
12

History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196,5 76-1-402; L. 1974, ch. 32, § 2.
Cross-References. — Computer Crimes Act
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating another statute, § 76-6-704.

Double jeopardy prohibited for same offense,
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const.,
Amend. V; $ 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Act."
Judgment entered for included offense after reversal of conviction.
Jurisdiction of a single court.
Lesser included offense.
—Aggravated assault.
—Aggravated robbery.
—Attempted homicide.
—Forcible sexual abuse.
—Instructions.
—Joy riding.
—Manslaughter.
—Negligent homicide.
—Theff.
Misdemeanor and felony charga*.
Separate offenses.
—Automobile violations.
—Burglary and larceny.
—Remoteness in time.
—Sex offenses.
Cited.
"Act."
"Act" as used in Subsection (1) includes not
only volitional acts of a defendant, but also the
number of victims, as each is acted upon by a

defendant. State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct.
App. 1989).
Judgment entered for included offense after reversal of conviction.
Where there was insufficient evidence to
support defendant's conviction for second degree murder, but there was sufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the included offense
of manslaughter, Supreme Court, pursuant to
this section, vacated and set aside the conviction of second degree murder on appeal and
entered a judgment of conviction for the included offense of manslaughter. State v.
Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982).
Evidence of depraved indifference to the risk
of death was insufficient to support defendant's
conviction of second degree murder, but there
was sufficient evidence of recklessness to support a conviction of the included offense of
manslaughter; the Supreme Court, pursuant to
Subsection (5), remanded the case to the trial
court with directions to set aside the verdict
and to enter a judgment of conviction for manslaughter. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214
(Utah 1985).
Jurisdiction of a single court.
Plea of guilty to two charges in justice of the
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GENERAL PROVISIONS

CRIMINAL CODE

the entering did not include and was independent of the larceny; each offense required different acts and former 9 76-1-23 did not preelude conviction on both burglary and larceny
charges. State v. Jones. 13 Utah 2d 35, 368
P 2d 262 (1962)
uw^i.
—Remoteness in time.
Where defendant was charged with theft of
an operable motor vehicle which occurred in
1981 and possession of a stolen vehicle occurring in 1985, because of the remoteness in time
of the two oflenses, Subsection (3) cannot bar
convictions of both offenses, as that subsection
is limited to and defined by "separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode." State
COLLATERAL

v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
cert, granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988).
__«
—
««* ° e n # ® * ' r j . .. .
•
. .
A
. ™ T a n #aC /
!P1? P e n e t r a t , o n P™***
penile contact, and the former act was in no
w a y neceasary
to
the |atter act tne two act8
were not
P*rt °f t h e "same act" and could supP°»*-two counts of aggravated sexual assault
htu
^ o n •»!>•«*• a c t a of forcible sexual abuse
? n ^ f o ^ L e , ***** S t a t e v Youn *» 7 8 ° p 2d
1233 (1989)

Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896
(Utah 1986); State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Utah
1987); State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah
1988); State v. Tuttle, 780 P. 2d 1203 (1989).
REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 177.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 20.

C.J.8. — 22 C J S Criminal Law § 14.
A.L.R. — Seizure or detention for purpose of
committing rape, robbery, or similar offense as
constituting separate crime of kidnaping, 43
A.L R 3d 699.
Lesser-related state oflense instructions:
modern status, 50 A.L.R.4th 1081.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 29.

76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should
have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution;
and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not
guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense
is an acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
16

76-1-404

(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination
takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal,
and takes place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However,
termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is
necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L.
1*13, ch. 196, 5 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, I 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Conduct constituting single crime.
Severed counts.
Cited.
Conduct constituting single crime.
Retention of stolen property of different individuals is a single act and a single offense
when evidence shows that the items were retained simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen
items were the subject of a previous prosecution for related oflenses, a second prosecution
was precluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203
(Utah 1983).

Severed counts.
This section does not mandate dismissal if
counts were properly severed. Thus, where a
magistrate severed counts "to promote justice"
and the district court later refused to rejoin
them for the same reason after defendant had
been convicted on one of the counts, the case
was not one that "should have been tried under
i 76-1-402." State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Utah
1987).
Cited in State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34
(Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 243 et seq.
C.J.S. — 22 C J.S. Criminal Law ft 208.
A.L.R. — Prosecution for robbery of one per-

son as bar to subsequent prosecution for robbery of another person committed at the same
time, 51 A L.R.3d 693.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 161.

76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — Prosecution in other
jurisdiction barring prosecution in state.
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses
within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction,
federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined
17

Rule 9

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993, designated as
"(a)" and rewrote the existing provisions, deleting "other than an infraction" after "offense,"
and added Subdivisions (b) to (e).

310

Cross-References. — Counsel for indigent
defendants, § 77-32-1 et seq.
Defense costs in criminal actions, convicted
defendants may be ordered to pay, § 77-32a-l
et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Determination of indigency.
—Appeal.
Self-representation.
Determination of indigency.
—Appeal.
The determination of indigency is a question
of fact to be determined by the trial court; once
that determination has been made, it is entitled to the same presumptions of correctness as
other trial court findings and determinations;
therefore, the person attacking that finding
has the burden to prove it is in error. Webster
v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978).
Self-representation.
Because the exercise of the right to defend
oneself in a criminal prosecution necessarily
constitutes a waiver of the important right to
professional counsel, trial courts have an affirmative duty to determine that a defendant who
chooses self-representation does so knowingly
and intelligently. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1991).
Trial court did not err in allowing defendant
to represent himself, after the court properly
inquired into defendant's wish to represent
COLLATERAL
Utah Law Review. — Judicial Jabberwocky or Uniform Constitutional Protection?
Strickland v. Washington and National Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 723.
A.L.R. — Relief available for violation of
right to counsel at sentencing in state criminal
trial, 65 A.L.R.4th 183.

himself, and properly took defendant's questionable mental health into account in considering the request. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1991).
The choice to represent oneself does not automatically give defendant access to research resources enjoyed by professional counsel. State
v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, £36 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).
A foreign-national defendant had a constitutional right to defend himself if he chose to do
so, notwithstanding his limited understanding
of English and of the U.S. judicial system; the
trial court deprived him of that right when it
applied an incorrect legal standard, considering the defendant's best interests and his technical ability to manage his own defense. Moreover, because the court's determination that
the defendant could not knowingly and intelligently choose self-representation was not supported either by the facts or by any meaningful
inquiry into the defendant's ability to understand the risks of self-representation, the case
was remanded to allow defendant to represent
himself. State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).
REFERENCES
Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepresentation, or failure to advise, of immigration
consequences of guilty plea — state cases, 65
A.L.R.4th 719.
What constitutes assertion of right to counsel following Miranda warnings — federal
cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 622.

Rule 9. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 201, § 2 repealed former § 77-35-9, and thus this rule,
effective April 23, 1990. For present comparable provisions, see § 77-8a-l. See also State v.

Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (applying § 77-8a-l
instead of this rule, finding that the repeal of
the statute operated to repeal the rule).

Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in single
court
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of state
laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances and arisingfroma single criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest
possible penalty of ail the offenses charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not
be separated except by order of the court and for good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged,
and a single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Edward Lane CORNISH, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 14782.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 1, 1977.
Defendant was convicted in Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M.
Hanson, Jr., J., of failure to stop at the
command of a police officer, and he appealed. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's failure to stop did not arise out of
the same "single criminal episode" as that
which justified his prior conviction for unlawful taking, and that double jeopardy
therefore did not prevent his conviction on
charges of failing to stop.
Affirmed.
Criminal Law *-202(1)
Where defendant was arrested after
high-speed chase and after he stopped vehicle in which he was riding and ran into field
where he was taken into custody, defendant's conviction for failure to stop at command of police officer, occurring after he
was convicted of unlawful taking of vehicle
in which he was riding, was not barred by
principles of double jeopardy, since actions
serving as basis for second conviction did
not take place as part of same "single criminal episode" as those serving as basis for
unlawful taking conviction. U.C.A.1953,
41-1-109, 76-1-401, 76-1-403.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
Larry R. Keller and Ronald J. Yengich of
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and appellant.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., William W.
Barrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and respondent.
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PER CURIAM:
Defendant was convicted of failure
stop at the command of a police officei
class A misdemeanor.
Briefly stated. On June 19, 1976, <
Dotson parked his car at a lounge. Wl
he returned some seven hours later it \
gone and Dotson reported it to the pol
On June 21, 1976, at about 1:30 a.
Officer Harris gave chase to the stolen
hide traveling in the wrong lane of traf
After a high-speed chase, defends
stopped the car and ran into a field wh<
he was taken into custody.
The only issue involved the interpretat
of Utah Code Ann., Sec. 76-1-403 (Su|
1975), and what is meant by a "single crii
nal episode." Defendant was origina
charged with failure to stop at the co
mand of a police officer and with the
Pursuant to a motion by the State, sepan
complaints were later filed. Defends
was convicted of the crime of "unlaw!
taking of a vehicle" under Sec. 41-1-K
U.C.A.1953.
Subsequent to the conviction for unla
ful taking, the instant suit was commenc
for failure to stop. Because the evider
was the same at both trials, it was stipul;
ed that the transcript of the earlier tr
could be introduced as the sum total of
the evidence. Defendant claims the t\
offenses were sufficiently related to cons
tute a "single criminal episode," and th
the trial for failure to stop was prohibit
by statute and was in violation of state ai
federal protections against double jeopard
We disagree and affirm the convictic
The phrase "single criminal episode" w
defined by the legislature in Utah Co
Ann., Sec. 76-1-401 (Supp. 1975) as follow
In this part unless the context requir
different definition, 'single criminal e\
sode' means all conduct which is close
related in time and is incident to an a
tempt or an accomplishment of a sing
criminal objective. [Emphasis added.]
Not only were the two offenses charge
separated in time by approximately one ft
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day, but they also were separate in objective. The objective of the unlawful taking
was to obtain possession, be it permanent or
temporary, of another's automobile. It was
a completed offense at the time the car was
taken. The objective of the failure to stop
was to avoid arrest for the traffic violations
he had just committed and/or to avoid being found in a stolen motor vehicle. To
treat them as a single criminal episode
would mean that any crime a defendant
commits to avoid arrest for prior criminal
activity would be part of the same criminal
episode. This does not appear to be the
intent of the statute and although the testimony given may overlap, the offenses are
different and the proof requirements are
different Because the offenses are distinct, the question of double jeopardy does
not even arise, as that protection relates to
prosecutions more than once for a single
offense.1

[O

I KEY NUIfKR SYSTEM

Tfce STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
iMMid L. SMITH, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 14859.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct 17, 1977.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart
M. Hanson, Jr., J., of issuing a bad check
and theft by deception and he appealed.
The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that:
(1) defendant's warning the payee that
there were insufficient funds to cover the
check did not raise the defense of voluntary
termination and entitle defendant to an in-

struction thereon where defendant, at the
time he warned payee, had already issued
the check, had taken possession of a deed in
exchange for the check, had transferred the
property to a third party, and the account
on which the check was drawn had been
closed the previous day; (2) the prosecutor's
approaching the bench and holding a discussion in front of the jury after receiving a
negative answer from defendant as to
whether he had ever been convicted of a
felony was not prejudicial, and (3) an instruction, "where a person intentionally
does that which the law declares to be a
crime, he is acting with criminal intent,
even though he may not know that his act
or conduct is unlawful," was not erroneous.
Affirmed.
1. False Pretenses <*»52
In prosecution for issuing bad check
and theft by deception, defendant's warning payee that there were insufficient
funds to cover check did not raise defense
of voluntary termination and entitle defendant to instruction thereon where, when
defendant warned payee, he had already
issued check, had taken possession of deed
in exchange therefor, had transferred property to third party, and account on which
check was drawn had been closed the day
prior to the offense.
2. Criminal

Law

«=> 706(1),

1037.1(3),

1037.2

After prosecutor received negative answer from defendant to question whether
he had ever been convicted of felony, prosecutor's approaching bench and having discussion in front of jury, but out of their
hearing, did not prejudicially imply that
defendant in fact had prior felony conviction; and furthermore, where no objection
was made by defense counsel and no request for cautionary instruction was made,
issue was not preserved for appeal.
3. Criminal Law *=> 772(5)
In prosecution for issuing bad check
and theft by deception, instruction, "where

1. Green v. V. S.t 355 U.S. 184. 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199.

a person intentionally does that which the
law declares to be a crime, he is acting with
criminal intent, even though he may not
know that his act or conduct is unlawful,"
was not erroneous.
David Paul White, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., William
W. Barrett, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and respondent
WILKINS, Justice:
Defendant was convicted by a jury of
issuing a bad check and theft by deception,
under Sections 76-6-505 and 76-6-405, respectively, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, and sentenced by the District
Court for Salt Lake County, to the indeterminate term of one to fifteen years. On
appeal, defendant seeks reversal of his conviction on both counts and contends that:
(1) Warning the payee that there are insufficient funds to cover the check raises a
defense of voluntary termination and the
trial court committed error in refusing to
instruct the jury thereon; (2) The prosecutor's examination of defendant on the question of prior felony convictions was reversible error; and (3) That an instruction was
misleading, causing prejudice to defendant's case. Affirmed. No costs awarded.
Defendant was in the business of promoting sporting events, and these activities
brought him in contact with James Eakins,
a professional athlete. Beginning in June,
1975, Mr. Eakins had several discussions
with defendant concerning the sale of the
Eakins' home. On or about October 20,
1975, defendant called Mr. Eakins to inform
him that he had obtained a loan that would
enable him to purchase the home. Later
that week, Mr. and Mrs. Eakins met with
defendant to prepare and sign the deed.
However, defendant stated that he did not
have any money with him, and the delivery
of the deed did not take place. A meeting
was arranged for the following day, October 23, 1975. Defendant arrived but
claimed to have forgotten the check. De-

fendant then suggested that Mr. Eakins
give him the deed, and he and Mrs. Eakins
could return to his office and pick up the
check. The deed was delivered to defendant, but the check was not given to Mrs.
Eakins because defendant maintained that
a second signature was necessary. Defendant obtained this signature and delivered a
check to Mrs. Eakins on October 24,1975, in
the amount of $32,453.51. Mrs. Eakins testified that defendant told her not to cash
the check immediately because the necessary funds were in another account, but
that they would be transferred by one
o'clock that same day. Defendant maintains that he did not say that the funds
would be transferred by one o'clock, but
that he said he would call by one o'clock to
let her know if they had been transferred.
Nevertheless, the funds that were supposed
to have been transferred were apparently
nonexistent The account on which the
check was drawn was closed on October 23,
1975, one day before the check in question
was written, although it was not shown
that defendant was aware of this. On that
day the account was closed by the bank, as
it was overdrawn by 539.70. The highest
balance in the entire record of the account
was $1044.40. The check was not honored.
On this same October 23, and prior to the
issuing of this check, defendant had transferred title to the property to a Mr. Crowley in satisfaction of a.previous debt, and
Mr. Crowley had mortgaged the property
[1] As to the offense of issuing a bad
check, defendant asserts that the trial court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it
is a defense if the maker informs the payee
that there are insufficient funds to covei
the check. Defendant asserts that the evi
dence supports such an instruction am
cites, as the applicable statute, Section 762-307, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a
amended:
It is an affirmative defense to a prose
cution in which an actor's criminal re
sponsibility arises from his own conduc
that prior to the commission o
the offense, the actor voluntarily termi
nated his effort to promote or facilitat
its commission and either:

